Following a recent exposé by Haaretz targeting Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli regime’s prime minister, Ynet, drawing on access to new intelligence sources, has published another revelation concerning Netanyahu. The reports point to growing discontent within the regime’s intelligence and security establishment toward Netanyahu, which is gradually spilling into the media through a steady stream of disclosures.
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According to a report published by Ynet and subsequently detailed by other Israeli media outlets, Israel’s security agencies had warned, prior to October 7, of the possibility that Hamas was using part of Qatar’s financial resources to strengthen its military wing. Netanyahu’s office and the Qatari government have rejected the allegations.
Ynet emphasizes that the central issue in the case is not merely the transfer of Qatari funds to Gaza. The more important question is what information Netanyahu’s cabinet had before October 7 regarding the ultimate destination and use of these funds, and to what extent that information influenced Netanyahu’s decision-making and the regime’s intelligence and security conduct.
The report claims that since 2018, Qatar had allocated tens of millions of dollars every month to Gaza. Netanyahu’s government supported the mechanism, with the official rationale being to prevent a humanitarian crisis, maintain economic stability, and reduce the likelihood of another confrontation with Hamas. However, according to intelligence documents cited by Ynet, Israeli security agencies believed that Hamas was diverting part of these resources to its military wing.
The Times of Israel, citing the testimony of a senior Israeli military intelligence officer, likewise reports that between at least 2019 and 2021, Hamas was transferring approximately $4 million per month from Qatari funds to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The same officer estimated the annual budget of Hamas’s military wing at the time at between $70 million and $100 million, and assessed that diverted Qatari funds accounted for roughly 50 percent of that budget. Another military intelligence document put the figure at approximately 40 percent.
If these assessments are accurate, the issue was therefore not merely a handful of isolated cases of financial misuse. Rather, resources amounting to tens of millions of dollars annually may have contributed to Hamas’s military capabilities.
Ynet makes an even more significant claim: in addition to the diversion of part of Qatar’s official assistance, Israeli intelligence had identified a separate covert financial channel that allegedly reached Hamas’s military wing directly. The report refers to this channel by the codename “Panther’s Eye.”
According to the report, Israeli intelligence assessed that the funds flowing through this channel came from wealthy Qataris, rather than necessarily being provided directly by the Qatari government. Nevertheless, Israeli intelligence officials reportedly believed that such transfers could not have taken place without the knowledge or approval of Qatari officials.
The Times of Israel notes that there was no precise estimate of the total amount involved, but figures cited in the reports ranged from approximately $100 million to several hundred million dollars.
This aspect of the report is particularly significant because, if the intelligence assessment cited is accurate, Israeli agencies had information not only about how Hamas was using official Qatari assistance, but also about an independent financial channel—and had conveyed this information to Netanyahu. Nevertheless, according to the account presented, the Israeli prime minister underestimated or discounted the assessments of the regime’s intelligence and security agencies.
According to Ynet, Netanyahu was specifically briefed at least twice about the transfer of Qatari funds to Hamas’s military wing.
The first briefing reportedly took place in 2019, when then-Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman raised the issue with the Israeli prime minister. The second came in 2020, when Israeli military intelligence reported the matter to Netanyahu.
A senior former Israeli intelligence official also told Ynet that the information held by the security agencies on the issue had been passed on to Netanyahu.
The report further states that Egypt had warned Netanyahu in 2018 that financial resources originating from Qatar and Turkey were being transferred directly to Hamas’s military wing and were not being used exclusively for civilian purposes.
Ronen Bar, who headed the Shin Bet at the time of the October 7 attack, stated in a document submitted before the end of his tenure in 2025 that the Shin Bet had repeatedly warned Netanyahu over the years that these resources were contributing to the strengthening of Hamas and its military activities. Bar also wrote that the Shin Bet had presented evidence indicating that the funds were reaching Hamas’s military wing indirectly.
The Times of Israel also emphasizes that one of the central aspects of the case is the gap between the Netanyahu government’s policy and the threat assessments produced by Israel’s intelligence agencies.
The significance of these documents becomes even greater when considered alongside recent reports concerning warnings issued before October 7.
Haaretz recently published a report showing that the president of the United Arab Emirates had personally warned Netanyahu several days before the October 7 attack about the possibility of an impending assault, Netanyahu kept from the regime’s intelligence and security agencies.
As a result, a fundamental question is increasingly emerging within the current Israeli debate:
Why, in addition to failing to adequately identify external threats, were Israel’s intelligence and security agencies unable to translate their warnings into political decisions by Netanyahu?
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