To examine the outlook of the negotiations between Iran and the United States, Iran Daily conducted an exclusive interview with Volker Perthes, the German diplomat and Middle East researcher.
Tehran – IranView24
Perthes is a well-known figure in European foreign policy and served for many years as the director of the prestigious think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. He is recognized as an expert on political developments in the Arab world, particularly in Syria and the region’s power transitions, and has published numerous scholarly works on these topics.
In 2021, Perthes was appointed as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan and headed the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. His mission was to support the political transition following the fall of Omar al-Bashir and facilitate dialogue between civilian and military actors. However, escalating internal conflicts and the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces posed serious challenges to his mission, and he ultimately resigned from his post in 2023.
Perthes is among the analysts who approach regional politics with a realistic perspective, carefully assessing the role of external powers in Middle Eastern dynamics. What follows is the full transcript of this interview.
How do you assess the structural prospects for success of the current phase of Iran-US negotiations from a European perspective?
It seems that both the United States and Iran want to reach a deal, and they would prefer to reach it through bilateral negotiations. They don’t want the same deal, though, so chances for success are rather limited. Seen from outside, it appears that Iran wants a deal that is similar to the JCPOA of 2015. US President Donald Trump wants a deal that goes far beyond the JCPOA. He wants Iran to reduce enrichment to zero, and oblige Iran to give up or strictly limit its ballistic missile programme. Also, while the Iranian side is prepared to engage in several rounds of negotiations, President Trump wants a quick deal. And if a quick deal is not in sight, he is prepared to use military force. The US has assembled an enormous amount of fire-power in the region, and it is prepared to strike once the president decides.
What fundamental strategic miscalculations should both sides avoid to prevent a renewed diplomatic deadlock?
Miscalculations are indeed a risk. Iran may underestimate President Trump’s preparedness to use the military force, and see the show of force just as a negotiation tactic.
It is not. Trump does not seem to be bluffing. The US side may also be miscalculating: The US military certainly has a list of targets which they are able to destroy, but it is not so clear whether they also have a strategy once major targets are destroyed. A military conflict between the US and Iran could lead to chaos in Iran itself, and in the region, and drag the United States into a much longer engagement than President Trump would want to see.
In your assessment, can confidence-building measures substantially reduce the significant trust deficit that has developed in recent years?
It is possible to see the ongoing negotiations themselves as attempts to build confidence. The lead negotiators – US envoy Witkoff, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi – have certainly made some progress here. The acceptance of direct negotiations by Iran could certainly help. But it is no guarantee for success without speedy progress on substance.
What constructive role could European actors or multilateral frameworks play in promoting a stable and viable agreement?
Other powers are basically watching: Russia and China will not come to Iran’s help. They would publicly denounce US military strikes, but not make any attempt to prevent it. Europe will not support US military strikes, and they will warn any rash action that could create more instability in the region. European powers still regret President Trump’s decision, in his first term, to abrogate the JCPOA, but they have also become increasingly dissatisfied with Iranian non-compliance. They would be prepared to re-engage in serious negotiations about a new comprehensive agreement. But they also understand that at this time, both Washington and Tehran do not seek Europe’s participation. The UN would be able to mediate, probably in cooperation with regional states like Oman. But there doesn’t seem to be any willingness in Washington or Tehran to allow the UN to do this.
To what extent do regional dynamics – in particular the role of the Persian Gulf states, Israel, and the increasing great-power rivalry – influence the respective negotiating positions of Tehran and Washington?
Regional states play a role. Israel is encouraging the United States to take a hard-line position and make sure that any deal would include an end to Iranian enrichment and at least a substantial reduction of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. The Persian Gulf Arab states want stability. Although they seem to be happy that Iran’s geopolitical project, the “Axis of Resistance”, has been broken, and Iranian influence in the region has been decimated, they don’t want a regional war, nor do they want chaos, revolution or civil war in Iran. They are therefore encouraging and facilitating US-Iran negotiations.
Source: Iran Daily, By Asgar Ghahremanpour
