The 60-day period agreed by Iran and the United States for negotiations and an end to the war has expired, while differences between the two sides are deeper than ever. The negotiations that were supposed to take place did not happen at all, and even a degree of military confrontation occurred during this period. At the same time, reports have emerged about an extension of the deadline, although this has not been officially confirmed. The question now is what significance the expiration or possible extension of the period carries, given that none of the plans set for this timeframe were implemented.
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Afifeh Abedi, an international affairs expert, told Iran Daily that since the Islamabad accord has effectively lost its function due to violations of commitments and the suspension of negotiations, the expiration of the 60-day deadline has no particular political or legal significance. Therefore, the most important issue for Iran at this stage is not the timeframe, but to maintain military deterrence while leaving room for political initiatives.
What practical and political significance does the end of the 60-day period, or its possible extension, have, and how will it affect the calculations of the two sides?
ABEDI: From a logical standpoint, the US violation of all the provisions of the Islamabad MoU and repeated exchanges of fire in southern Iran essentially meant that the understanding had failed. Therefore, the end of the 60-day period set for the ceasefire between the two sides should not be viewed as a serious calendar deadline either. In practice, no ceasefire was observed that could now come to an end.
From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the current “minimal stability” does not constitute an end to the war either. Rather, the war is continuing in other forms.
It should also be noted that the 60-day framework was essentially designed to buy time to reach a final agreement, but the negotiating process stalled over disagreements about compliance with the initial provisions of the MoU.
In fact, when the Islamabad understanding itself has effectively lost its function due to violations of commitments and the suspension of negotiations, the expiration of the 60-day deadline carries no particular political or legal significance.
The US has also repeatedly kicked off surprise wars at the height of negotiations, and if it has temporarily halted direct military action, this is due to operational constraints rather than legal commitments.
Therefore, the ongoing Iran-Oman talks, as well as the behind-the-scenes and indirect negotiations between Iran and the US, should be viewed merely as “buying time” for the start of another round of war.
The experience of several recent rounds of negotiations with the US has also reinforced the message for Iran that negotiations, and even an agreement, without an implementation mechanism and effective guarantees cannot provide a sufficient basis for lowering its level of defensive preparedness.
Therefore, Iran’s calculation regarding the end of the 60-day period is not simply a matter of whether the “ceasefire” will be extended. The most important issue for Iran at this stage is to maintain military deterrence while leaving room for political initiatives.
How long can the current situation, which has affected countries across the Middle East, continue, and what are the possible scenarios ahead?
The presence of US military bases in regional countries and their permission for Washington to launch military action against Iran from those bases was the reason the entire region became involved in Iran’s retaliatory attacks during the aggressive US-Israeli war.
Likewise, the continued US presence in regional countries has created an unstable balance between deterrence and escalation.
Iran certainly has an interest in preventing the war from turning into a prolonged conflict, but the security predicament created by the US in the region does not allow this. Therefore, to prevent another war, Iran has no choice but to maintain an environment of escalation and deterrence.
On the other hand, the US is facing the economic and military costs of the war, the fallout in energy markets, and international pressure stemming from the sharp decline in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and heightened sensitivity in oil markets. Yet it is effectively showing that Washington’s calculations remain the same mistaken calculations that led to the war — namely, taking advantage of an opportunity to strike Iran.
Therefore, unless the US demonstrates a change in its calculations in practice, this grey zone will continue.
In any case, for Iran, which has been subjected to aggression, a state of no war, no peace is part of the broader war environment.
But the main losers from these circumstances are certainly the Persian Gulf states, which are caught in a climate of instability.
This situation, however, is favorable to Israel, which is geographically farther from the epicenter of the war. Israel is probably the key actor most interested in maintaining the “no war, no peace” situation so that it can push it back toward escalation at the first opportunity.
In fact, the reason Iran insists on the withdrawal of the US from the region is to put an end to this state of chaos.
Based on the experience of the past three wars, the continued operation of US bases means creating a security predicament for Iran, the consequences of which spill over into the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf and, consequently, into regional countries.
This situation will end only when the cost of the US and Israel returning to war against Iran exceeds the benefits. But this balance is inherently fragile, because any incident can alter the calculations.
Can the end of the ceasefire and the escalation of tensions between Lebanon and Israel be linked, or are these two separate developments? Could these tensions be seen as a US tool for putting pressure on Iran without engaging in military confrontation on Iranian territory?
Israel’s aggressive actions toward Lebanon should be analyzed on two levels. One is the historical level, as well as the opportunities and threats arising from geography, while the other concerns the ongoing regional war and the war between the US-Zionist-Arab axis and the Resistance Axis.
On the one hand, the intensification of attacks and Israel’s continued efforts to occupy southern Lebanon are part of Israel’s seven-decade effort to expand its geographical reach in the region.
On the other hand, they are aimed at disrupting the synergy among the Resistance Axis in the ongoing war against Iran.
For this reason, the expiration of the 60-day ceasefire period could provide Israel with another pretext to step up operations in southern Lebanon.
Therefore, from a logical standpoint, developments in Lebanon cannot be viewed merely as a bilateral crisis between Israel and Hezbollah.
If Israel intensifies its attacks in Lebanon, we will probably see another round of escalation on the Iranian front.
As a result, one entirely plausible scenario is that Israel will use the opportunity created by the deadlock in Iran-US negotiations to increase pressure on Lebanon. But not only Iran; the other components of the Resistance Axis should also not remain indifferent to the continuation of aggression against Lebanon.
Iran Daily, By Delaram Ahmadi
