Iran’s foreign minister has presented Tehran’s proposals for ending the war to Pakistani mediators, who have reportedly conveyed them to Washington. An English media outlet recently published a report claiming Iran has proposed that the issue of the Strait of Hormuz and the US naval blockade be resolved first, with the nuclear file deferred to a later stage. In an interview with Iran Daily, international affairs analyst Hossein Kazemi argues that even if the proposal were accepted by the United States, it would likely remain confined to the current phase of the conflict and the short term.
Tehran – IranView24
If reports about Iran’s new proposal are accurate, do you believe Washington would accept such sequencing? What factors could increase or reduce the chances of US acceptance?
If the United States were to accept such a proposal in the dimensions reflected in media reports, it could be interpreted as part of an effort to manage and contain global market prices. Domestic factors such as the upcoming electoral climate—which is highly sensitive to price trends—could strengthen the case for short-term acceptance in Washington.
Beyond that, US regional partners, as influential external actors, may seek through their own lobbying channels to overcome anti-Iran lobbies and raise the odds of this scenario gaining traction, particularly given their own serious food security challenges and the need to repair their economies.
Overall, Washington may in the short term regard such sequencing as a form of “temporary ceasefire.” But if it concludes that the initiative would weaken its nuclear pressure leverage, the likelihood of acceptance would diminish. In that case, any acceptance would be better understood as aimed at restoring and replenishing vital energy reserves.
Yet, considering the scale of US military activity during the current ceasefire period, the type of strikes inflicted on infrastructure, and Washington’s expectation of generating fractures on Iran’s domestic front through economic and cognitive pressure, the prospects of sustained long-term acceptance remain very low. Therefore, even if accepted, it would likely be limited to this phase of the conflict.
What role could Israel play in facilitating or disrupting this path? Could Tel Aviv, through political pressure or actions on the ground, block progress on this new diplomatic track?
While Israel’s role in shaping outcomes is undeniable, the United States should still be viewed as the principal architect of “governance of tension,” while Israel is better understood as an executor that manages the costs of escalation, as well as the pace of implementation within the broader US design.
Tel Aviv has consistently been an influential actor in calibrating the balance of tension in this file. If it perceives that any maritime or regional arrangement could lead to greater convergence between Iran and Arab states, it would likely seek—through political pressure on Washington or through intelligence and deterrent field actions—to slow the process or make it more costly.
Nevertheless, the macro-design and framework of tension governance are largely formulated in Washington, while Israel acts more as an operational arm, or as an accelerator and decelerator. It can regulate the level of friction, but is not necessarily the ultimate architect of the trajectory.
On the other hand, given recent field confrontations, Israel’s capacity to open a new front may be limited. Under such conditions, its focus may shift away from direct action and more toward influencing public opinion and US decision-making structures.
In short, Israel’s role should be analyzed through the lens of “managing the scope and rhythm of tension”—a role more concerned with containment, calibration and delay than with outright determining or halting the course altogether.
How should the Iranian foreign minister’s trip to Moscow and meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin be interpreted in relation to this proposal? Could the visit be aimed at securing strategic backing for the plan or exerting indirect pressure on the United States?
The meeting with Putin can be seen as an effort to align the Tehran-Moscow axis both in the battlefield and in regional diplomacy.
From Iran’s perspective, the visit carries meaning on at least two levels:
First, securing strategic backing, in a way that sends a clear signal to Washington that this is not merely a unilateral initiative by Tehran, but one that can be understood within a shared geopolitical weight.
Second, increasing indirect pressure on the United States, especially at a time when Washington-Moscow relations remain strained and Russia has the capacity to bring both the energy card and the Strait of Hormuz into broader global calculations.
Still, the success of such maneuvering ultimately depends on how far Moscow is prepared to bear the political cost of openly backing such a plan.
What matters here is that Iran appears to have correctly recognized that the core conflict is not simply a war over a maritime passage, but a contest over control of one of the principal nodes in the vital flows of global order. Such a field naturally requires a degree of prior strategic coordination before any new order becomes institutionalized at the international level.
From that angle, making intelligent use of the capacities of powers that share interests with Iran in certain domains is not a luxury option, but a necessity for elevating Tehran’s position in the architecture of a future order.
If the United States does not agree to this proposal, what alternative short-term scenarios could Iran pursue?
First, intensifying tactical control over the Strait of Hormuz in a way that raises the cost of ignoring its proposal, while avoiding direct military confrontation.
Second, strengthening parallel diplomatic tracks with Russia, China and Arab states to demonstrate that Iran’s complete isolation is not feasible.
Third, managing time by preserving the status quo in the nuclear file to prevent a new consensus from forming against it until political conditions in the United States or the region shift.
It could be said that although this phase carries risks of escalation, it still forms part of a “diplomatic timing game,” through which Iran seeks to leverage time itself while increasing its bargaining power.
Source: Iran Daily
