What was initially described by Israel as a “terrorist attack” with a possible foreign origin has now become more than merely a security incident in the skies; it has turned into another scandal for the Israeli intelligence and security establishment.
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Flydubai flight FZ1073, which departed Dubai for Tel Aviv on September 30, made an emergency landing at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia after a confrontation between the Emirati-Indian captain and the Omani first officer, followed by a severe loss of altitude. Emirati and Israeli officials quickly described the incident as a “terrorist act,” and investigations were launched in Dubai, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv.
Although Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime, quickly raised the possibility of Iranian involvement in the incident, other questions were simultaneously being raised on social media, with some users linking the incident to Netanyahu and Mossad.
The important point is that questions initially raised by the public on social media gradually made their way into the Israeli media as well:
How was an individual who, under Israel’s security regulations, should essentially not have been permitted to operate on a flight arriving in Tel Aviv able to enter the cockpit despite the crew information having been submitted in advance?
Haaretz: Israel Had the Crew Information Before the Flight
While Israeli officials sought to emphasize the dimensions of the incident as part of an organized terrorist operation by highlighting the first officer’s Omani nationality, one of the most significant developments in the case came with the publication of an investigative report by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.
According to the report, information concerning the crew of flight FZ1073 had been provided to the Israeli side before the aircraft departed. The Israel Tax Authority has also confirmed receipt of the flight information. Nevertheless, the first officer’s Omani nationality did not trigger a security alert.
This is particularly significant because Oman does not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and under the security arrangements cited by Tel Aviv, the use of crew members from countries that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel on inbound flights to Israel is subject to security restrictions.
But Haaretz emphasizes a key point: the issue is not simply that “a suspicious pilot passed through a security screening process”; the issue is that his identity information already existed, yet Israel’s security system either failed to identify it or, in practice, failed to turn it into an operational security alert.
Israeli Transport Ministry’s Admission
Israel’s Ministry of Transport has stated that it does not conduct background checks on foreign pilots and that responsibility for intelligence and security screening in this area rests with the security agencies, particularly Mossad.
These statements have raised new questions about the performance of Israel’s intelligence and security establishment, especially given that the first officer’s identity information had been provided to the Israeli side before the flight.
The Wall Street Journal has also referred in a recent report on the Flydubai incident to “multiple security failures” in Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, writing that weaknesses in coordination and background screening enabled the individual to be present in the cockpit.
The case, therefore, is no longer solely about the conduct of an individual; it has become a question concerning the effectiveness of the chain of security controls and intelligence-sharing mechanisms among different institutions.
It is also worth noting that the incident occurred at a time when Israel is simultaneously seeking to expand its intelligence and security cooperation with regional countries, including Saudi Arabia. The security concerns that Israel raises by invoking the names of various countries, including Oman, may well be part of an effort to encourage or pressure these countries into intelligence cooperation with Tel Aviv.
Flydubai Was Also Committed to Complying With Israeli Security Regulations
At the same time as pressure has mounted on the regime’s intelligence apparatus, another issue highlighted in Israeli reports concerns the commitment made by the Emirati airline Flydubai itself.
According to published reports, Flydubai had undertaken to Israel to comply with the security regulations governing flights to Israel and to use, on Israeli-bound flights, pilots who were nationals of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.
The presence of an Omani first officer indicates that this undertaking was, at least in this case, not honored.
It should be recalled that this lapse by the Emirati airline has attracted attention at a time when reports have also recently emerged concerning previous warnings allegedly issued by the UAE president to Netanyahu ahead of the October 7, 2023 attacks. The warnings were reportedly related to the possibility of similar incidents occurring.
Nevertheless, Haaretz emphasizes that even if Flydubai’s failure is established, this would not eliminate the potential responsibility of Israeli agencies, because the central question remains: if the crew manifest had been provided to the Israeli side before the flight, why was the discrepancy concerning the first officer’s nationality not detected?
The First Officer’s Background: Another Link in the Chain of Uncertainty
According to new reports, Australian authorities have also launched an investigation into the Omani first officer’s links to Australia. He had previously studied in Australia, and the country’s security agencies are examining his activities and possible associations during his time there.
Reports have also emerged alleging that he had previously been removed from flight-related duties in Oman over concerns regarding extremist tendencies.
If these reports are ultimately confirmed, questions surrounding how he passed through the various security-screening mechanisms will take on greater significance, particularly for Israeli intelligence agencies, which claim to possess one of the world’s most extensive intelligence and security networks.
The issue is especially significant given that pressure on the security establishment of the Israeli regime over intelligence failures preceding the October 7, 2023 attacks continues.
An Electoral Warning — Just 24 Hours Earlier
One of the most sensitive aspects of the case is the political timing of the incident.
Benjamin Netanyahu, who portrays himself as “the man of security,” stated on September 29 — just one day before the Flydubai incident — at the Tel Nof Airbase that there were “indications” that Israel’s enemies might attack the country before the election.
Less than 24 hours later, the Flydubai incident occurred.
The significance of this coincidence becomes greater when considering that Israel’s election is scheduled to take place on October 27 and that Netanyahu is facing a situation in which the security record of his government, particularly in connection with the intelligence failures preceding October 7, has come under widespread criticism.
Yair Lapid, Netanyahu’s political opponent, also stated after receiving a security briefing from the prime minister that no threat resembling the aircraft incident had been raised during a meeting held only a few hours before the incident.
This issue has raised a serious political question in Tel Aviv:
If Netanyahu was genuinely aware of a specific or imminent threat, why was that threat not raised during the security meeting with the opposition leader?
The Washington Post has also pointed to this contradiction, writing that the Flydubai incident has become a significant political issue within Israel’s electoral environment; Netanyahu’s supporters view it as confirmation of his earlier warnings, while his opponents regard the incident as another example of a security failure during his tenure as prime minister.
Questions That Remain Unanswered
Haaretz emphasizes that regardless of the outcome of the investigation into the first officer, Israel still has to explain why its security system failed to identify an individual whose identity information had been provided to the Israeli side before the flight.
If the failure lay solely with Flydubai, why did Israel’s security mechanisms not detect the discrepancy?
If responsibility for the screening process rested with the security agencies, why are the Ministry of Transport and the intelligence agencies presenting differing accounts of their respective responsibilities?
And if Netanyahu had information or indications one day before the incident that Israel’s enemies might launch an attack, what was the source of that warning, and why was no similar threat raised during the security meeting held before the incident?
Particularly if subsequent investigations uncover evidence of organized links or the involvement of other actors, the dimensions of this case could extend far beyond a security failure.
