Afifeh Abedi, an international affairs expert, told Iran Daily that since the Islamabad accord has effectively lost its function due to violations of commitments and the suspension of negotiations, the expiration of the 60-day deadline has no particular political or legal significance. Therefore, the most important issue for Iran at this stage is not the timeframe, but to maintain military deterrence while leaving room for political initiatives.<\/p>\n
What practical and political significance does the end of the 60-day period, or its possible extension, have, and how will it affect the calculations of the two sides?<\/strong><\/span> How long can the current situation, which has affected countries across the Middle East, continue, and what are the possible scenarios ahead?<\/span><\/strong> Based on the experience of the past three wars, the continued operation of US bases means creating a security predicament for Iran, the consequences of which spill over into the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf and, consequently, into regional countries. Can the end of the ceasefire and the escalation of tensions between Lebanon and Israel be linked, or are these two separate developments? Could these tensions be seen as a US tool for putting pressure on Iran without engaging in military confrontation on Iranian territory?<\/strong><\/span> Iran Daily, By Delaram Ahmadi<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The 60-day period agreed by Iran and the United States for negotiations and an end to the war has expired, while differences between the two sides are deeper than ever. The negotiations that were supposed to take place did not happen at all, and even a degree of military confrontation occurred during this period. At […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":7096,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[67,70,72],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7095","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis-and-notes","category-conversation","category-the-most-important-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7095","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7095"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7095\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7098,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7095\/revisions\/7098"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7096"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7095"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7095"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7095"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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ABEDI: From a logical standpoint, the US violation of all the provisions of the Islamabad MoU and repeated exchanges of fire in southern Iran essentially meant that the understanding had failed. Therefore, the end of the 60-day period set for the ceasefire between the two sides should not be viewed as a serious calendar deadline either. In practice, no ceasefire was observed that could now come to an end.
\nFrom the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the current \u201cminimal stability\u201d does not constitute an end to the war either. Rather, the war is continuing in other forms.
\nIt should also be noted that the 60-day framework was essentially designed to buy time to reach a final agreement, but the negotiating process stalled over disagreements about compliance with the initial provisions of the MoU.
\nIn fact, when the Islamabad understanding itself has effectively lost its function due to violations of commitments and the suspension of negotiations, the expiration of the 60-day deadline carries no particular political or legal significance.
\nThe US has also repeatedly kicked off surprise wars at the height of negotiations, and if it has temporarily halted direct military action, this is due to operational constraints rather than legal commitments.
\nTherefore, the ongoing Iran-Oman talks, as well as the behind-the-scenes and indirect negotiations between Iran and the US, should be viewed merely as \u201cbuying time\u201d for the start of another round of war.
\nThe experience of several recent rounds of negotiations with the US has also reinforced the message for Iran that negotiations, and even an agreement, without an implementation mechanism and effective guarantees cannot provide a sufficient basis for lowering its level of defensive preparedness.
\nTherefore, Iran\u2019s calculation regarding the end of the 60-day period is not simply a matter of whether the \u201cceasefire\u201d will be extended. The most important issue for Iran at this stage is to maintain military deterrence while leaving room for political initiatives.<\/p>\n
\nThe presence of US military bases in regional countries and their permission for Washington to launch military action against Iran from those bases was the reason the entire region became involved in Iran\u2019s retaliatory attacks during the aggressive US-Israeli war.
\nLikewise, the continued US presence in regional countries has created an unstable balance between deterrence and escalation.
\nIran certainly has an interest in preventing the war from turning into a prolonged conflict, but the security predicament created by the US in the region does not allow this. Therefore, to prevent another war, Iran has no choice but to maintain an environment of escalation and deterrence.
\nOn the other hand, the US is facing the economic and military costs of the war, the fallout in energy markets, and international pressure stemming from the sharp decline in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and heightened sensitivity in oil markets. Yet it is effectively showing that Washington\u2019s calculations remain the same mistaken calculations that led to the war \u2014 namely, taking advantage of an opportunity to strike Iran.
\nTherefore, unless the US demonstrates a change in its calculations in practice, this grey zone will continue.
\nIn any case, for Iran, which has been subjected to aggression, a state of no war, no peace is part of the broader war environment.
\nBut the main losers from these circumstances are certainly the Persian Gulf states, which are caught in a climate of instability.
\nThis situation, however, is favorable to Israel, which is geographically farther from the epicenter of the war. Israel is probably the key actor most interested in maintaining the \u201cno war, no peace\u201d situation so that it can push it back toward escalation at the first opportunity.
\nIn fact, the reason Iran insists on the withdrawal of the US from the region is to put an end to this state of chaos.<\/p>\n
\nThis situation will end only when the cost of the US and Israel returning to war against Iran exceeds the benefits. But this balance is inherently fragile, because any incident can alter the calculations.<\/p>\n
\nIsrael\u2019s aggressive actions toward Lebanon should be analyzed on two levels. One is the historical level, as well as the opportunities and threats arising from geography, while the other concerns the ongoing regional war and the war between the US-Zionist-Arab axis and the Resistance Axis.
\nOn the one hand, the intensification of attacks and Israel\u2019s continued efforts to occupy southern Lebanon are part of Israel\u2019s seven-decade effort to expand its geographical reach in the region.
\nOn the other hand, they are aimed at disrupting the synergy among the Resistance Axis in the ongoing war against Iran.
\nFor this reason, the expiration of the 60-day ceasefire period could provide Israel with another pretext to step up operations in southern Lebanon.
\nTherefore, from a logical standpoint, developments in Lebanon cannot be viewed merely as a bilateral crisis between Israel and Hezbollah.
\nIf Israel intensifies its attacks in Lebanon, we will probably see another round of escalation on the Iranian front.
\nAs a result, one entirely plausible scenario is that Israel will use the opportunity created by the deadlock in Iran-US negotiations to increase pressure on Lebanon. But not only Iran; the other components of the Resistance Axis should also not remain indifferent to the continuation of aggression against Lebanon.<\/p>\n