What unfolds in negotiation rooms is often merely the reflection of decisions already taken at higher levels of power and in the real arena. For this reason, any dialogue\u2014before it becomes diplomatic\u2014is fundamentally a matter of calculation.<\/p>\n
R. Hejazi, WANA<\/strong><\/p>\n At a time when the United States, after receiving Iran\u2019s concrete proposals in Oman and Qatar, reverted to a path of threats\u2014from the escalation of rhetoric by Donald Trump to the deployment of an aircraft carrier and additional fighter jets to the region\u2014Geneva was more than just a venue for talks. It became the intersection of two distinct logics: the logic of \u201ccoercion through threat\u201d versus the logic of \u201cdeterrence before negotiation.\u201d<\/p>\n Washington\u2019s behavioral pattern is clear. First, a display of power in the field and in the media; then an attempt to translate that pressure into concessions at the negotiating table. This is the familiar model of \u201cforce-based diplomacy,\u201d which assumes that the opposing side, when faced with military threats, will soften its positions. In this logic, an aircraft carrier is not primarily a weapon of war; it is a tool of negotiation.<\/p>\n But this model rests on a critical assumption: that the other side perceives the threat as credible and calculates the cost of resistance to be higher than the cost of concession.<\/p>\n It was precisely at this point that the stance of\u00a0Seyyed Ali Khamenei\u00a0fundamentally altered the equation. His remarks\u2014delivered exactly as the Geneva talks were underway\u2014were not an emotional reaction to threats, but a carefully calibrated strategic message to Washington. When he stated:<\/p>\n \u201cAn aircraft carrier is indeed a dangerous instrument, but more dangerous than the carrier is the weapon that can send it to the bottom of the sea,\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n two messages were conveyed simultaneously:<\/p>\n Within this framework, the invocation of a \u201cregional war\u201d takes on its meaning. This was not a declaration of war, but a declaration of the impossibility of a limited war\u2014precisely what U.S. strategy requires and yet seeks to avoid.<\/p>\n When the leader of a country neutralizes a threat, the psychological burden of pressure is lifted from the negotiating team. The sound of an aircraft carrier\u2019s engines no longer automatically translates into concessions on the table. The other side is compelled to enter negotiations with real offers.<\/p>\n Alongside this strategic message, Iran activated three parallel tracks:<\/p>\n In diplomacy:<\/strong>\u00a0the preparation of a dual-track proposal with detailed substance and a serious presence at the Geneva negotiations\u2014sending a clear signal that Tehran has not abandoned talks, but is not pursuing them from a position of weakness.<\/p>\n In the field:<\/strong>\u00a0smart-control military drills in the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with explicit warnings demonstrating that deterrence is not merely rhetorical. The message was unambiguous: if military pressure is to be used as a negotiating tool, its costs will spiral beyond control.<\/p>\n In internal security and media:<\/strong>\u00a0readiness to counter any attempt at domestic destabilization, given that experience has shown internal unrest to be a complement to external pressure.<\/p>\n This is the very synergy of field and diplomacy. Crucially, it does not mean closing the door to negotiations; rather, it means removing dialogue from a state of emergency and transforming it into a conscious choice.<\/p>\n In this context, the Supreme Leader\u2019s emphasis that \u201cif negotiations are to take place, predetermining their outcome in advance is a wrong and foolish approach\u201d established a strategic principle: negotiation is a tool for problem-solving, not an instrument of surrender.<\/p>\n This statement directly targeted the core of the U.S. demand\u2014namely, securing a predetermined outcome (the deprivation of Iran\u2019s nuclear capabilities) before talks even begin.<\/p>\n It was under this balance that\u00a0the second round of indirect talks in Geneva\u00a0was held. The post-negotiation remarks by Seyed Abbas Araghchi\u2014ranging from \u201cvery serious discussions\u201d and \u201cgood progress\u201d to an emphasis on the difficulties ahead\u2014accurately reflected this atmosphere: neither na\u00efve optimism nor deadlock.<\/p>\n Even the Omani foreign minister\u2019s comments about \u201cprogress in defining common objectives\u201d indicate that military pressure has failed to dominate the negotiating table unilaterally, though it has not yet bridged the underlying security gaps.<\/p>\n The most important achievement of this phase is neither an agreement nor even a draft text, but a shift in the other side\u2019s mindset. When the United States realizes that military threats not only fail to yield concessions but actually raise the costs of negotiation, it will be forced to reconsider its strategy and adjust the rules of the game.<\/p>\n In this sense, Ayatollah Khamenei rewrote the negotiation equation:<\/p>\n Negotiation\u2014yes.<\/p>\n Imposition\u2014no.<\/p>\n Power before agreement,<\/p>\n and diplomacy carried on the shoulders of the field.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" What unfolds in negotiation rooms is often merely the reflection of decisions already taken at higher levels of power and in the real arena. For this reason, any dialogue\u2014before it becomes diplomatic\u2014is fundamentally a matter of calculation. R. Hejazi, WANA At a time when the United States, after receiving Iran\u2019s concrete proposals in Oman and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":4338,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[67,71,69],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4337","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis-and-notes","category-important-news","category-note"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4337","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4337"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4337\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4340,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4337\/revisions\/4340"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4338"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4337"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4337"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4337"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}The U.S. Strategy: Pressure Outside, Concessions at the Table<\/span><\/h2>\n
Tehran\u2019s Response: Changing the Assumption<\/span><\/h2>\n
\n
Iran\u2019s Three Parallel Policies<\/span><\/h2>\n
A Shift in the Balance<\/span><\/h2>\n