{"id":2944,"date":"2025-12-01T00:00:41","date_gmt":"2025-11-30T20:30:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/?p=2944"},"modified":"2025-12-01T19:44:59","modified_gmt":"2025-12-01T16:14:59","slug":"fidans-visit-to-tehran-what-shifts-are-expected-in-iran-turkey-relations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/fidans-visit-to-tehran-what-shifts-are-expected-in-iran-turkey-relations\/","title":{"rendered":"Fidan\u2019s Visit to Tehran: What Shifts Are Expected in Iran\u2013Turkey Relations?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p data-start=\"155\" data-end=\"702\">The visit of Hakan Fidan to Tehran is not merely a diplomatic appointment; it is a signal that Iran &#8211; Turkey relations are entering a new phase -one in which geopolitical rivalries, regional tensions, and the structural pressures of the international order are giving way to a more complex model of tactical cooperation, mutual deterrence, and a recalibration of West Asia\u2019s security landscape. Tehran and Ankara now stand at a juncture that could reshape the balance of power in the Caucasus, Syria, Iraq, and the broader region in the months ahead.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"704\" data-end=\"735\"><strong data-start=\"704\" data-end=\"735\">IranView24 \u2013 Foreign Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p data-start=\"737\" data-end=\"1241\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">Today\u2019s visit by Hakan Fidan, Turkey\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Tehran can be interpreted within the framework of an ongoing \u201creconfiguration of the security and political architecture of bilateral and regional relations\u201d between Ankara and Tehran\u2014a process which, over the past two years, has managed to advance on a relatively stable and predictable path despite external structural pressures, numerous geopolitical ambiguities, and both overt and covert competition within spheres of influence.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"737\" data-end=\"1241\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">\n<p data-start=\"159\" data-end=\"212\"><span style=\"font-size: 14pt;\"><strong data-start=\"159\" data-end=\"212\">The Governing Approach in Tehran\u2013Ankara Relations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p data-start=\"214\" data-end=\"606\">To understand the relatively stable trajectory of relations between Tehran and Ankara, it is essential to note that Iran and Turkey\u2014distinct from most actors in the Middle East\u2014manage their bilateral relationship through a paradigm of \u201cmanaged competition\u201d combined with \u201cpurposeful tension-containment.\u201d This model, which blends realism with diplomatic pragmatism, enables both countries to:<\/p>\n<ul data-start=\"608\" data-end=\"901\">\n<li data-start=\"608\" data-end=\"722\">\n<p data-start=\"610\" data-end=\"722\">pursue their national strategic interests and traditional spheres of influence without fundamental compromise;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li data-start=\"723\" data-end=\"901\">\n<p data-start=\"725\" data-end=\"901\">while simultaneously recognizing, albeit implicitly, each other\u2019s red lines and preventing the relationship from crossing into a phase of direct and irreversible confrontation.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p data-start=\"903\" data-end=\"965\">This tension-management mechanism rests on three core pillars:<\/p>\n<ol data-start=\"967\" data-end=\"1368\">\n<li data-start=\"967\" data-end=\"1055\">\n<p data-start=\"970\" data-end=\"1055\"><strong data-start=\"970\" data-end=\"1019\">Maintaining high-level communication channels<\/strong>, even in periods of acute crisis;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li data-start=\"1056\" data-end=\"1230\">\n<p data-start=\"1059\" data-end=\"1230\"><strong data-start=\"1059\" data-end=\"1112\">Deliberately compartmentalizing competitive files<\/strong> (Syria, the Caucasus, Iraq, Kurdish issues) from areas of mutually beneficial cooperation (energy, trade, transit);<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li data-start=\"1231\" data-end=\"1368\">\n<p data-start=\"1234\" data-end=\"1368\"><strong data-start=\"1234\" data-end=\"1270\">Employing multilayered diplomacy<\/strong>, in which competition in one domain is offset or balanced by compensatory cooperation in another.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p data-start=\"1370\" data-end=\"1725\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">Within this framework, Fidan\u2019s visit to Tehran is more than a routine diplomatic engagement; it is an indication of the consolidation of this bilateral architecture against regional shocks\u2014ranging from developments in Syria to tensions in the South Caucasus\u2014and a joint effort to prevent proxy-driven crises from spilling over into the Tehran\u2013Ankara axis.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"1370\" data-end=\"1725\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">\n<h3 data-start=\"162\" data-end=\"214\"><strong data-start=\"166\" data-end=\"214\">2. The Architecture of Iran\u2013Turkey Relations<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p data-start=\"216\" data-end=\"397\">As demonstrated in today\u2019s meetings between the Turkish foreign minister and Iranian officials, the Tehran\u2013Ankara relationship operates through a combination of four key layers:<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"216\" data-end=\"397\">\n<h3 data-start=\"404\" data-end=\"473\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">1. Complementary Economies: Energy, Trade, and Transportation<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>At this level, the mutual economic needs of Iran and Turkey\u2014particularly in energy, transit, and complementary markets\u2014create a foundation of durable convergence. Iran, with its energy resources and strategic geography, and Turkey, with its logistical capacity and economic connectivity to Europe, function as two complementary actors within a shared regional framework.<\/p>\n<p>Currently, approximately 26% of Turkey\u2019s gas imports\u2014around 10 billion cubic meters annually\u2014are supplied by Iran. The long-term 25-year contract (expiring in 2026, with an option for extension) remains one of the central pillars of Turkey\u2019s energy stability. For Tehran, the continuation\u2014and potentially the expansion\u2014of these exports not only ensures steady foreign-exchange revenue but also constitutes a significant strategic lever in Iran\u2013Turkey relations.<\/p>\n<p>Turkey is now Iran\u2019s second-largest trading partner after China, and the volume of formal and informal exchanges between the two countries surpassed $14 billion in 2024. Mechanisms such as barter arrangements, financial swap channels through smaller Turkish banks, and the use of the lira and rial in settlement processes represent key economic pathways that enable Tehran and Ankara to mitigate the pressures of secondary banking sanctions.<\/p>\n<p>Iran, by linking its railway infrastructure to Turkey (through the Razi\u2013Kap\u0131k\u00f6y crossing and the ongoing Van\u2013Tabriz\u2013Rasht project) and by activating the North\u2013South Corridor via Bandar Abbas and the Caspian Sea, aims to position itself as a critical node in both East\u2013West and North\u2013South transit chains. Turkey, for its part, cannot complete the \u201cMiddle Corridor\u201d of the modern Silk Road -stretching through Kazakhstan- without cooperation with Iran.<\/p>\n<p>This geo-transit synergy generates mutual, non-negotiable interests that, even at moments of peak political tension, act as a buffer preventing any structural rupture in the bilateral relationship.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 data-start=\"171\" data-end=\"236\"><strong data-start=\"175\" data-end=\"236\">2. Divergences and Tactical Convergence in Regional Files<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>The dossiers of Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus constitute the primary arenas of geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey. Yet, unlike the hostile and zero-sum models seen elsewhere in the region, this competition has remained manageable, with communication channels consistently kept open.<\/p>\n<p>The South Caucasus is the most challenging file in Tehran\u2013Ankara relations. Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020) and developments surrounding the Zangezur Corridor, Turkey has sought to solidify the Baku\u2013Ankara axis and secure a direct route to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Iran, however, has declared any alteration of geopolitical borders\u2014particularly any disruption of its territorial connection to Armenia and, by extension, to Europe\u2014as a national security red line. Despite this strategic divergence, both countries rely on a mechanism of parallel diplomacy and controlled pressure, preventing escalation into open confrontation.<\/p>\n<p>In the Syrian file, the landscape is undergoing rapid transformation. Since December 2024\u2014when Turkey regarded the collapse of Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government as a strategic victory over Iran\u2014Syria has paradoxically turned into a high-risk Achilles\u2019 heel for Ankara. While the presence of Assad had ensured Turkey that Israel would not directly encroach into northern Syria, the new government in Damascus has shown limited capacity or willingness to resist Israeli expansionism. As a result, Israel is incrementally becoming a direct neighbor of Turkey, a development Ankara views as a significant strategic threat.<\/p>\n<p>Consequently, the potential for tactical cooperation between Iran and Turkey regarding Syria has increased considerably. This evolving coordination is likely to extend into the Iraq file and the broader South Caucasus, signaling a shift from pure competition to calibrated collaboration where the security interests of both states intersect.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 data-start=\"196\" data-end=\"282\"><strong data-start=\"200\" data-end=\"282\">3. The Added Layer of Influence Competition in the Cultural\u2013Security Geography<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p data-start=\"284\" data-end=\"670\">Iran possesses political and security instruments of influence across Shi\u2019a communities and within the Axis of Resistance. Turkey, by contrast, leverages a combination of soft power, political currents aligned with Ankara, and economic depth. These two influence models do not necessarily collide in all arenas; in several cases, they function as a form of \u201csoft division of labor.\u201d<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"672\" data-end=\"891\">Nevertheless, Ankara\u2019s emphasis on pan-Turkic policies in areas adjacent to Iran -and its rhetorical targeting of Iran\u2019s Azeri-speaking population- has become a persistent source of mistrust between Tehran and Ankara.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"672\" data-end=\"891\">\n<h3 data-start=\"898\" data-end=\"964\"><strong data-start=\"902\" data-end=\"964\">4. Shared Perception of Structural International Pressures<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p data-start=\"966\" data-end=\"1294\">The intensifying U.S.\u2013China rivalry, the redefined role of Russia after the Ukraine war, and the unstable security environment in West Asia have pushed both Tehran and Ankara toward recalibrating relations with their neighbors. One dimension of Fidan\u2019s visit can be analyzed precisely within this broader structural context.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"1296\" data-end=\"1872\">Notably,, despite Turkey\u2019s membership in NATO, Ankara\u2019s relationship with the West lacks organic cohesion and has therefore remained an object of continuous security hedging in Western capitals. Over recent decades, Turkey has been characterized in Western strategic thinking as an <strong data-start=\"1582\" data-end=\"1619\">\u201c<\/strong>unreliable independent variable\u201d, prompting the United States and Europe to adopt various deterrent, managerial, and at times restrictive policies aimed at preventing Turkey from evolving into a fully autonomous regional power or a potential disruptor of Western security architecture.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"1874\" data-end=\"2062\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">These dynamics have pushed Ankara toward greater diversification in its foreign policy orientation and expanded tactical engagement with independent regional actors\u2014including Iran.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"1874\" data-end=\"2062\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">\n<p data-start=\"1874\" data-end=\"2062\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\"><span style=\"font-size: 14pt;\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<article class=\"text-token-text-primary w-full focus:outline-none [--shadow-height:45px] has-data-writing-block:pointer-events-none has-data-writing-block:-mt-(--shadow-height) has-data-writing-block:pt-(--shadow-height) [&amp;:has([data-writing-block])&gt;*]:pointer-events-auto scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]\" dir=\"auto\" tabindex=\"-1\" data-turn-id=\"request-WEB:48afc2b5-7bb9-4d6a-96c2-73a0ae5cad7d-27\" data-testid=\"conversation-turn-56\" data-scroll-anchor=\"true\" data-turn=\"assistant\">\n<div class=\"text-base my-auto mx-auto pb-10 [--thread-content-margin:--spacing(4)] thread-sm:[--thread-content-margin:--spacing(6)] thread-lg:[--thread-content-margin:--spacing(16)] px-(--thread-content-margin)\">\n<div class=\"[--thread-content-max-width:40rem] thread-lg:[--thread-content-max-width:48rem] mx-auto max-w-(--thread-content-max-width) flex-1 group\/turn-messages focus-visible:outline-hidden relative flex w-full min-w-0 flex-col agent-turn\" tabindex=\"-1\">\n<div class=\"flex max-w-full flex-col grow\">\n<div class=\"min-h-8 text-message relative flex w-full flex-col items-end gap-2 text-start break-words whitespace-normal [.text-message+&amp;]:mt-1\" dir=\"auto\" data-message-author-role=\"assistant\" data-message-id=\"3d881ac2-b28d-41e0-aa10-8945889504b3\" data-message-model-slug=\"gpt-5-1\">\n<div class=\"flex w-full flex-col gap-1 empty:hidden first:pt-[1px]\">\n<div class=\"markdown prose dark:prose-invert w-full break-words light markdown-new-styling\">\n<p data-start=\"172\" data-end=\"381\">From Iran\u2019s perspective, Hakan Fidan\u2019s visit signals the transition of bilateral relations from a phase of uncertainty to one that is more manageable, predictable, and politically and strategically beneficial.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"383\" data-end=\"505\">Despite persistent areas of competition, the architecture of Tehran\u2013Ankara relations now rests on three principal pillars:<\/p>\n<ol data-start=\"507\" data-end=\"664\">\n<li data-start=\"507\" data-end=\"554\">\n<p data-start=\"510\" data-end=\"554\"><strong data-start=\"510\" data-end=\"552\">Mutual economic\u2013energy interdependence<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li data-start=\"555\" data-end=\"610\">\n<p data-start=\"558\" data-end=\"610\"><strong data-start=\"558\" data-end=\"608\">Sophisticated management of geopolitical files<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li data-start=\"611\" data-end=\"664\">\n<p data-start=\"614\" data-end=\"664\"><strong data-start=\"614\" data-end=\"664\">Strategic use of international structural gaps<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p data-start=\"666\" data-end=\"1049\" data-is-last-node=\"\" data-is-only-node=\"\">While this does not constitute a strategic alignment between the two states, it yields an important outcome for Iran: under current regional and international conditions, Iran and Turkey function less as threats to one another and more as components within each other\u2019s mechanisms for managing environmental risks. Fidan\u2019s visit underscores the consolidation of precisely this model.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"z-0 flex min-h-[46px] justify-start\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"mt-3 w-full empty:hidden\">\n<div class=\"text-center\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<div class=\"pointer-events-none h-px w-px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" data-edge=\"true\"><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The visit of Hakan Fidan to Tehran is not merely a diplomatic appointment; it is a signal that Iran &#8211; Turkey relations are entering a new phase -one in which geopolitical rivalries, regional tensions, and the structural pressures of the international order are giving way to a more complex model of tactical cooperation, mutual deterrence, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2945,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[67,69,72],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2944","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis-and-notes","category-note","category-the-most-important-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2944","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2944"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2944\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2947,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2944\/revisions\/2947"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2945"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2944"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2944"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranview24.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2944"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}