Donald Trump, the U.S. president, launched his new game with Iran by interventionist remarks on Iran’s domestic protests, and portraying the military threat as imminent, he has once again placed Iran’s nuclear file at the center of his policy, claiming he seeks a new agreement with Tehran. But why?
Tehran – IranView24
In recent weeks, as everyone has been waiting for Trump’s order to attack Iran, he has said in his latest remarks regarding Iran that he “hopes Tehran will agree to a deal under which Iran would not possess nuclear weapons.” The remark appears to be a continuation of Washington’s long-standing line. Yet the position takes on a meaning when viewed alongside Trump’s earlier claims. Beyond his initial assertions of support for protesters and terrorist cells organized by Israel, it bears recalling that following the illegal and aggressive attacks of June 22, 2025, Trump claimed Iran’s nuclear program had been “destroyed” during the military developments of recent months. Now the question is if Iran’s nuclear program had truly been eliminated, why has the White House once again made it the central pillar of its policy toward Tehran?
First, it is necessary to point out the political nature of long-standing U.S. claims about Iran’s nuclear program—false claims that have consistently served as a pretext for exerting political, economic, and military pressure against Iran, and paved the way for the June attacks and the subsequent assertion that nuclear facilities were “destroyed” during the 12-day war. The experience in the last two decades show that Iran’s nuclear program is not merely a collection of physical facilities that can completely be erased through a handful of strikes, acts of sabotage, or assassinations of scientists. Indigenous technical expertise, human and academic networks, and a dispersed, localized infrastructure related to the program enable rapid reconstruction. Even Western intelligence assessments of the impact of last summer’s attacks spoke of the program being “set back,” not definitively ended. Trump’s renewed focus on the nuclear file, therefore, is less a sign of retreat from a victory than an implicit admission of the fact that Iran’s nuclear program has neither been destroyed nor is it destructible, and instead, it is an explicit admission of the U.S. habitual politicization underlying allegations against Iran.
Second, the nuclear issue appears to function as Trump’s primary lever for shaping a deal or extracting concessions. Trump’s conduct in foreign policy is built on “maximum pressure for maximum gain”: first portraying the situation as a crisis, then presenting himself as the actor capable of ending it through a historic agreement. In reality, however, Iran’s nuclear issue serves as a pretext for a security concern, and the real story is the U.S. refusal to accept an independent Iran; the United States views the Islamic Republic of Iran as an obstacle to creating a dependant, subordinate Iran.
Third, the return to the nuclear file stems from America’s structural lack of confidence in the feasibility and low legitimacy of war against Iran. From this perspective, the emphasis on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons provides the most legitimate framework for sustaining pressure, sanctions, the mobilization of regional allies, and the extraction of broader concessions in other areas such as Iran’s missile program and regional influence.
Finally, Trump’s domestic motives should not be overlooked. Facing declining popularity and political legitimacy, he is in need of a foreign policy achievement, and an agreement with Iran could serve that purpose. Stressing that “Iran must not have nuclear weapons” allows him to both gain relative support for adventurist actions against Iran inside the U.S., and portray himself internationally as a proactive and decisive actor.
In this light, Trump’s renewed focus on the nuclear issue—though seemingly at odds with his earlier claims—actually represents a continuation of Washington’s traditional strategy against Iran: exaggerating the threat to build international backing, and applying pressure through imposed negotiations with predetermined conditions, aimed at weakening and disarming Iran and, consequently, enabling to advance a weakened and capitulated Iran.
