Recent Israeli moves to consolidate political and security presence in Somaliland are not merely a limited tactical shift in the Horn of Africa, rather, they reflect a profound realignment in the regional balance of power. This roadmap—aligned with the United Arab Emirates and enjoying implicit U.S. support—directly targets Saudi Arabia’s strategic depth, turning the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait into a new focal point of geopolitical pressure on Riyadh.
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The potential Israeli presence in Somaliland cannot be interpreted solely within the framework of conventional geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa, Red Sea security dynamics, or even strategic synergy with the United Arab Emirates. At a deeper level, this development carries structural implications for the regional balance of power and, in particular, can be viewed as a direct existential threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security and strategic depth—a threat that is not temporary, but long-term and multilayered.
Somaliland, a region in northern Somalia that unilaterally declared autonomy in 1991, lacks formal international recognition. Nevertheless, in practice it has become a gray geopolitical actor. Owing to its privileged geographic position along the Gulf of Aden and its proximity to the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, it has long been the focus of attention for regional and extra-regional powers. Israel’s recent diplomatic recognition of Somaliland is not a symbolic gesture, but a deliberate step aimed at entrenching Tel Aviv’s political, security, and potentially military presence in one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical chokepoints.
Another key piece of this puzzle is the active role of the United Arab Emirates in Somaliland. Since 2017, Abu Dhabi—through the establishment of a military base and major infrastructure investments at the port of Berbera—has effectively turned the region into one of the pillars of its maritime strategy in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The UAE has also, at times, acted as a mediator between Somalia’s central government and Somaliland’s local authorities, seeking to strengthen the region’s standing as an independent—albeit unofficial—political entity. Under such circumstances, Israel’s entry into the Somaliland equation should be analyzed as part of a deeper strategic alignment between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi.
On the ground, multiple reports suggest that Israel is considering the establishment of a military or intelligence base in Somaliland—one whose functions could go far beyond monitoring Yemen or ensuring maritime security in Bab al-Mandeb.
At a superficial level, the potential Israeli deployment in Somaliland is often analyzed as a tool for monitoring Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, controlling global trade routes, and countering maritime threats. Ansarullah’s reaction—declaring any Israeli presence in Somaliland a “legitimate military target”—has reinforced this interpretation. However, focusing exclusively on Yemen or Bab al-Mandeb obscures the broader strategic consequences of this development.
From a strategic perspective, Somaliland is gradually becoming a strategic base for Israel—one that could complete a ring of geopolitical pressure around the Arabian Peninsula. Israel’s presence in the southern Red Sea, combined with its security and technological ties with the UAE in the Persian Gulf and its expanding relations with certain African actors, effectively places Saudi Arabia in a situation akin to a “geopolitical encirclement.” This encirclement is not necessarily formed through direct military confrontation, but through intelligence dominance, security penetration, and control over strategic chokepoints—developments that would also severely undermine Saudi Arabia’s geoeconomic position.
An Israeli presence in Somaliland could shift the balance of power in the Red Sea to Riyadh’s disadvantage, restrict Saudi Arabia’s strategic freedom of action, and even affect its calculations in Yemen, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the strengthening of the UAE’s role as Israel’s key ally in this geography would structurally deepen internal fractures within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Clearly, such a move would not be feasible without the awareness, coordination, and a degree of support from the United States. The historical record of U.S. foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Middle East shows that Washington has consistently backed Israel’s peripheral strategies—particularly in regions recognized as geopolitical and logistical chokepoints. Within this framework, Israel’s roadmap to entrench its presence in Somaliland is not an independent initiative, but part of a broader security architecture that overlaps with U.S. objectives of containing rivals, controlling global energy and trade routes, and reshaping the balance of power in the Red Sea. Washington’s silence or lack of explicit opposition to Israeli activities in the region can be interpreted as a sign of tacit approval, and even operational support.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s behavior reflects a defensive approach centered on threat management through indirect channels. Riyadh appears—especially during the Donald Trump administration—to have sought to raise the political and strategic costs for Washington of any direct pressure or redesign of its surrounding security environment by offering massive investments, extensive arms deals, and tying U.S. economic interests to Saudi domestic stability. This strategy has been less about fundamentally countering U.S. and Israeli regional projects and more about “keeping the center of threat” away from Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical borders and pushing it toward more distant peripheries.
Recent developments, however, indicate that this approach has not necessarily been effective and does not guarantee Riyadh’s long-term security. The growing U.S.–Israeli alignment in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea suggests that overarching geopolitical considerations have taken precedence over economic and transactional ones. As a result, Saudi Arabia faces a situation in which, despite heavy investments to secure Washington’s political support, it remains exposed to a redefinition of its surrounding security environment—one that could significantly limit its influence and strategic maneuverability in one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical arenas.
Overall, Somaliland is no longer merely a disputed autonomous region; it is becoming a geopolitical link connecting the security of the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Peninsula. Within this context, a potential Israeli deployment in Somaliland should be seen not as a limited tactical move, but as part of Tel Aviv’s grand strategy to redefine Saudi Arabia’s surrounding security environment and reshape the regional balance of power—a strategy whose consequences will become increasingly evident in the years ahead.
Strategic Conclusion Focusing on the Imperatives of Changing Saudi Arabia’s Regional Strategy
Developments related to Somaliland and the expanding roles of Israel, the UAE, and the United States in the Horn of Africa indicate that Saudi Arabia’s surrounding security environment has entered a new phase—one in which the continuation of Riyadh’s traditional strategy, based on reliance on the U.S. security umbrella and managing threats through economic and arms-related ties, no longer meets the requirements of national security and strategic depth.
The first strategic imperative for Saudi Arabia is to move beyond a defensive, reactive posture and adopt an active, preemptive regional policy. Riyadh must define the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea not as peripheral buffer zones, but as direct extensions of its national security.
This necessity becomes even more pronounced given the structural and identity-based divergence between Saudi Arabia on one side and the UAE and Israel on the other in defining interests, regional roles, and preferred models of order—a divergence that is not merely tactical or temporary, but strategic and fundamentally irreconcilable.
The second imperative is to redefine Saudi Arabia’s alliance policy. The widening rift with the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s clear alignment with Israeli strategies require Riyadh, within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to seek a rebalancing of intra-group relations while simultaneously building a more diverse network of regional and extra-regional partners. Continued exclusive dependence on the United States, without diversifying strategic options, will exacerbate Saudi Arabia’s long-term security risks.
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia must shift its regional strategy from a logic of “reducing pressure through concessions” to one of “active and multilayered deterrence.” Otherwise, Somaliland will be only an initial example of a broader pattern in which Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical periphery gradually becomes a sphere of influence and deployment for strategic rivals—a pattern that, if consolidated, could impose long-term security, economic, and political costs on Riyadh and even threaten Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity.
