Iran and the United States have entered a phase of tension neither similar to the patterns of past crises nor governed by previous rules. Four new variables, ranging from a shift in Iran’s deterrence strategy to simultaneous mediation efforts by multiple regional states, have created a complex equation that could determine the fate of confrontation or an agreement in the days ahead.
Dr. Rahman Ghahremanpour, International Relations Analyst
The current tensions between Iran and the United States are defined by four main characteristics. In other words, the broader environment or context of this tension has four distinct features that set it apart from earlier crises, and even from the last year’s tension.
First, Iran has firmly threatened that if a war breaks out, Iran will turn it into a regional conflict, and if the United States or Israel attacks Iran in any form, the consequence will be the regional conflict. In the past, Iran has not articulated such a threat, and it operated within a framework of “strategic patience” and was reluctant to see the war openly spill over into the region. This marks a new variable whose impacts must be assessed on U.S. behaviour, on the one hand, and the regional states, on the other hand. The U.S. naval forces deployed in the region, along with missile defense systems such as THAAD and the drones transferred to the area, appear aims at preventing any spillover into a regional war, and reinforcing Washington’s deterrence should conflicts erupt.
The second factor should be noted analyzing the current situation is the wave of protests that took place in January. The reactions of both the Islamic Republic and the United States to these protests are significant. On the one hand, there was an unprecedented level of external support—particularly from Donald Trump—for the protests. On the other, the Islamic Republic for the first time announced that the unrest was a kind of quasi-coup aimed at regime change, one without precedent in earlier episodes. In other words, both the external actor views the protests through a particular lens, and the Islamic Republic has unprecedentedly elevated the level of threat and its understanding compared with previous protests about which such an interpretation was absent.
The third factor contributing to the analysis of the situation is Washington’s assessment that Iran is at its weakest point. This view is not limited to Trump; U.S. intelligence agencies also share the same interpretation. Just days ago, it was announced that the CIA had formally reached this analysis, and this assessment was publicly published, indicating that the United States is viewing the present tension through this lens, and will act accordingly even in diplomatic negotiations as well. This is the reason why the United States stresses extracting maximum concessions from Iran.
The fourth—and particularly important—factor in the analysis of the current situation is the emergence of regional mediation phenomenon. In the past, mediation efforts between Iran and the United States were typically undertaken by a single country. Today, however, a group of regional states—including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Oman—are seeking to prevent the conflict. This is a relatively new phenomenon in the Middle East. Given the absence of strong regional institutions, mediation efforts have often failed to yield satisfactory results. It therefore remains to be seen how effective this new framework—apparently aligned with proposals from Iran—will prove, that is, mediation, today, is no longer confined to Oman or Saudi Arabia alone; rather, a series of countries that maintain both relatively good relations with Iran and close ties to Washington are pursuing a diplomatic solution regarding the current tension. This could enhance the prospects for diplomatic success, provided both sides, namely Iran and the United States, are willing to revisit their positions. Iran appears prepared to revise some of its earlier stances. The United States, however, seems that is not prepared to offer more concessions, as Trump sees himself in a position of strength, and U.S. intelligence agencies and security institutions view Iran the same way. In the lexicon of “coercive diplomacy,” it is the concessions offered by the party exerting pressure that prove very decisive in reaching a final agreement.
Considering these four new variables, the current tension should be assessed. Given the broader environment and the past behavior of both sides, it seems that there is little chance of reaching a diplomatic agreement at present. Both the Islamic Republic and the United States, voicing rhetorical support for negotiations, in practice and from a military perspective, are preparing for a potential clash. At the same time, U.S. and even Israeli officials have spoken of the likelihood of a preemptive Iranian move, which may be intended to provoke Iran into acting first before them so that this response could be framed as a preemptive action. For Instance, events occurred on Saturday in Bandar Abbas and Ahvaz may be indicative of efforts by the United States and Israel to push Iran toward an action that Washington could then portray as preemption.
Nevertheless, given the active involvement of regional mediators, their extensive efforts, and the roles of Russia and probably China have increased the chances of reaching a diplomatic agreement compared with the past. The likelihood of an agreement is higher than it was two months ago, but lower than it was in May 2025, as Iran has been attacked, its nuclear facilities damaged, and as a result, its willingness to offer broad concessions has diminished. At the same time, as noted earlier, Trump views Iran as being in a weak position, and believes that the window of opportunity for potential military action will not remain open for a long term. From this perspective, Trump also strives to achieve a diplomatic agreement within a limited timeframe, as in the viewpoints of some U.S. officials and hardline factions, Iran is trying to buy time, navigate this phase, and then return to the normal condition.
All of this underscores the need for caution, although the world of politics constitutes the world of contingencies, and it is likely for Iran and the United States to reach a diplomatic agreement through regional mediators. The coming days will be decisive—particularly the role Russia may play regarding Iran’s 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which could prove one of the main keys to achieving a diplomatic agreement.
