Analyses of the 12-day Iran–Israel war in the summer of 2025 show that, contrary to early Western media narratives of a “decisive Israeli victory,” an examination of operational goals, field data, and expert assessments indicates a strategic stalemate.
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Middle East Monitor, in an analysis published on November 17, writes that neither side achieved its key objectives during the 12-day war, and the outcome remains “ended but unresolved.”
Responding to the narratives of a “decisive Israeli victory,” the report notes that assessing the outcome based on the scale of physical damage is not accurate; the valid criterion is the degree to which strategic objectives were achieved. Based on this, analysts categorize Israel’s overall objectives as follows:
▪️Delivering a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program
▪️Creating lasting degradation in Iran’s missile capabilities and defense systems
▪️Causing structural disruption in Iran’s command network through assassinating senior commanders
▪️Triggering and activating social divisions leading to domestic unrest inside Iran
An evaluation of the data shows that none of these objectives have been fully achieved. According to Middle East Monitor, although some nuclear infrastructure was damaged, critical facilities — including Fordow — remained largely intact, and Iran continued developing its deep-underground sites. This indicates that Israel only imposed a time delay on Iran’s nuclear program, not a strategic destruction of it.
In the missile domain, the report, citing Western analysts, explains that Israel’s initial strikes caused tactical damage at some bases, but these impacts were short-lived. Iran managed to restore operational capacities in a limited time, and its production infrastructure proved more resilient than Israel’s early estimates. Therefore, the goal of creating long-term degradation in Iran’s missile program was not achieved.
Another part of the report evaluates Israel’s expectations regarding the effects of assassinating Iran’s senior commanders. Tel Aviv expected these operations to collapse — or at least severely disrupt — Iran’s command network. However, succession processes were carried out rapidly and in an organized manner, and the command structure, despite the initial shock, maintained its cohesion and operational effectiveness. Even Tehran’s diplomatic calculations toward returning to negotiations showed that strategic coherence remained intact. In other words, Israel succeeded in causing disruption but fell far short of achieving structural collapse.
The analysis also notes that Israel’s assumptions about widespread social unrest in Iran proved incorrect. No significant wave of unrest emerged; previous political grievances were sidelined, and society reacted to foreign attack with a behavior of national solidarity. This was the most unmet category of Israel’s objectives.
In its final assessment, Middle East Monitor analysts state that Israel achieved certain tactical gains, but failed to accomplish its strategic goals. The result, therefore, was a 50–50 strategic stalemate — a situation described even in internal Israeli evaluations as “ended but unresolved.”
